Speaker by Various Artists

Interview with The Reverend

by The Rt Rev Richard Randerson

The Rt Rev Richard Randerson, dean of Auckland's Holy Trinity Church was kind enough to come on my Wire show on 95bFM yesterday, and a good interview took place on the matter of the controversial comments by the new head of the Anglican church in New Zealand, Archbishop Whakahuihui Vercoe reported in the Weekend Herald last Saturday.

The transcript below (thanks to Patrick Crewdson for such a prompt and accurate job) can't fully reflect the tone of the discussions, but I thought the Rev Randerson was since and genuine in what he said. Clearly, the church has some sorting out to do after this business. Anyway, read on, Cheers, RB.

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Russell Brown If you picked up the Weekend Herald on Saturday, you couldn't have missed its screaming headline: "a world without gays". The story below was based on an interview with Bishop Whakahuihui Vercoe, the new head of the Anglican church in New Zealand.

Bishop Vercoe expressed the hope that one day society would embrace a "new morality" to the extent that homosexuality would become unacceptable and - however unlikely this may seem - disappear entirely. He also declared a view that we should "close the door" on immigration and said that he would never ordain a Maori woman as a priest, for cultural reasons - even though the church does accept women as priests.

It looks like a lurch to the right for New Zealand's biggest church - but the irony is that it was prompted by the most liberal of urges. As the Reverend Richard Randerson explained in a sermon after the election of Bishop Vercoe, the church has worked hard to embrace the Treaty, and has a separate Maori caucus. When the time came to vote on a new Primate, the Pakeha caucus didn't put up a candidate - it was time, said the Reverend Randerson, for leadership to pass to tikanga Maori, in the form of Bishop Vercoe.

Richard Randerson joins us now, to discuss what has become a controversial appointment. Reverend Randerson - welcome.

Rt Rev Richard RandersonGood afternoon. Thank you.

RB: Firstly, do you think Bishop Vercoe was treated fairly by the Herald?

RRRR: I think they gave undue prominence to his remarks they way they plastered it right across the front page. At the same time, they were accurate in what they reported and I think he was culpable in having used the words he did in describing homosexuality as sinful and unnatural and an abomination. I think those words were somewhat intemperate and he would have been better not to have used them.

RB: He hasn't apologised though, has he?

RRRR: Well, no, he hasn't really, and what I think was the most unfortunate thing was that he made no reference to the General Synod resolution. If your listeners read the Herald for this morning you'll see an article which I had written on the opinion page pointing out that the General Synod - that's the national body of the Anglican Church - that they passed a resolution last month which acknowledged and honoured the contribution that gay and lesbian Anglicans make to the life and ministry of our church. Now that's the official view of the Church. The archbishop is entitled to his opinions and they should be listened to with respect, but at the same time he needs to state what the General Synod resolution was and he omitted to do that.

RB: His views weren't a secret before the vote though, were they? He's expressed them before.

RRRR: Yes.

RB: Were they a consideration in the vote?

RRRR: It was a very difficult thing because, as the introduction to this interview mentioned, in the tikanga Pakeha caucus we felt it was not appropriate to cling to Pakeha leadership of the Church. Our church models a partnership between Maori and Pakeha, and Pacific Islanders as well, and so the question of leadership also has a tikanga dimension to it. We felt tikanga Maori - the Maori stream of the church - that it was time that they made a leadership offering. So we really, I think, as Pakeha passed the mantle across and we felt in doing so we had to leave it to them to decide who it was. It wasn't for us to tell them who they could have and who they could haven't. Some people say that was a mistake, but that was our feeling, that we should not try to dictate what choice they made. And so they did have some debate within the Maori caucus but in the end they came up with Archbishop Vercoe as their nomination and so it really came to us to endorse that.

RB: Can you see the irony in the fact that the most liberal of motivations, the desire to embrace the Treaty, has resulted in what looks like a lurch to the right for the Church in New Zealand?

RRRR: Yes, I see the irony in that entirely, and I have nothing to say that can lessen the irony of that. It was a debate in the end between the mana of another tikanga taking the lead vis-a-vis the personal views of a particular person, in this case Archbishop Vercoe. And I guess Pakeha ran with the tikanga issue rather than the personal choice one.

RB: I recall a sermon by you last year where you emphasised that love and commitment are to be admired in any relationship. That's still your view, I take it?

RRRR: Yes it is and I've set it out very clearly in the article in this morning's Herald. And that's a view that the Archbishop of Canterbury - as a person now, not in his official leadership - he made a study of sexuality in the 1980s and he came to the view that the nature of the relationship is more important. He said, for example, that faithful and committed same-sex relationships might also be acceptable in the eyes of God. I support that view of the Archbishop of Canterbury, I support the appointment of the Archbishop of New Hampshire in the USA, the gay bishop there, which has sparked tremendous controversy, of course.

RB: That's been a highly controversial issue within the Church itself, hasn't it?

RRRR: Yes, it has.

RB: Is that any closer to resolution?

RRRR: A special commission has been set up worldwide by the Anglican Church to look at issues of unity - how do we maintain unity in the Anglican Church when there are sincerely-held opinions on both sides of the debate? We have to be able to respect the differences and listen to people whose view is different from ours. That's the trick, I think, not to try and reach an agreement that this is right or that is right, but to say 'We need to be in respectful dialogue together'. That is, I believe, the way forward at this time.

RB: Now, I have a story which I can assure you is not apocryphal. It's that of a young, gay Maori man who spent Saturday in tears after reading that Herald story. He felt he had pride in the whole of who he was and yet he'd been told that he was an abomination to the dark races. How do you feel about that?

RRRR: I feel absolutely appalled that the story in the Herald should have that impact upon him. I feel for him and many others entirely, and I would like to apologise formally now to gay and lesbians in the community and to other members of the community who were offended and damaged by those remarks in the Herald. I am terribly sorry for them, for the damage that it caused. Although I'm only one individual bishop in the Church, nonetheless I just want to say how deeply distressed I am by the remarks and the impact they have had on people, like the young man you quote.

RB: How will this be handled in the Church? Where will it go from here?

RRRR: Well, the General Synod - as I say the national body of the Church that met last month in Rotorua - they committed themselves to a process of dialogue in the resolution. The first part of the resolution, as I said, affirmed the life and ministry of gay and lesbian people in the Anglican Church. The second part called for a new study, and as part of that study it calls upon us all to listen actively - and I'm quoting now from the resolution - "to listen actively to the opinions of gay and lesbians, both practicing and celibate, before we start making any recommendations. So that process of listening and dialogue that we are committed to is the way ahead.

RB: Reverend Randerson, thank you for your time.

RRRR: Good to speak.

The multicultural freak-out

by Che Tibby

I've never really understood what it is about multiculturalism that make conservatives loose their 'nana. Maybe it's the way the idea seems to involving having to sit next to someone you think is "stinky" on the train or bus. I mean, I used to hear all this talk about biculturalism and wonder what the fuss was. When you grow up in Mount Maunganui the "weird outsiders" usually come from Auckland, and talking with Maori is something you grow up doing.

Even then my mispronunciation of Maori words was, to my mind today, shocking. I remember very clearly one year an older woman asking me how to spell my name. Having told her, she stated categorically she would instead call me "chee", like in cheese. Seeing my puzzled expression, she said, "ok, so say Maori, not mao-ree". Hearing your name pronounced "chee" can be grating.

I realised a few years later that maybe I got away with murdering Te Reo for so long because of a necessary tolerance on behalf of Maori society, a tolerance that was wearing thing by the 1980s.

It's this necessity, tolerance, that seems to be at the heart of so many arguments for and against multicultural ideas like biculturalism. But, what has become obvious to me since living here in Melbourne is that the biculturalism I heard so much about in New Zealand is not so very different to the stereotypical idea of multiculturalism spouted by pollies and journos on this side of the ditch. Sure, tolerance is a key factor, but the heart of the matter is how the majority deals with difference.

There's many great things about Melbourne but a few really stand out. The first is the commuting. For three bucks you have two hours to travel across the entire centre of the city on any form of public transport you like, bus, train or tram. For five you can travel all day within "zone one" (if you have to travel outside "zone one" you're officially in the suburbs... aargh). The second is the music. There's enough kiwi bands over here to prove that point. The third is the food, authentic egg noodle soup with wonton and bbq pork, $7.50.

The last is the diversity. When I first arrived here I was living out in zone two somewhere, and made the move to inside zone one pretty much as soon as I woke up. It wasn't much of an improvement. Camberwell, the suburb the Sullivans grew up in might be picturesque on the telly, but in reality it's an upper middle class nightmare. Bailing yet again, I moved to Richmond, a poorer neighbourhood that borders downtown and the really expensive neighbourhoods of Prahran and Toorak (which is across the river).

Now, to be completely honest I was on the northern border, and only had to walk across the road to get to the run-down neighbourhood of Abbotsford. But to say Richmond is a bit more hip. It's a bit like Grey Lynn and Arch Hill.

The point though is that this road I had to cross was called Victoria Street, and is a main thoroughfare for the trams that used to wake me up at 5am. Now, everyone needs a decent coffee at that time of day, and if you've run out you'll find Victoria Street is of little help. The problem is that at many times of day you'll be lucky to see a white person, because everyone is Vietnamese. So noodles, sui mai? No problem. Coffee? You'll want to fossick around an out of the way store, or make a trip to the supermarket.

Most tourists who come to Melbourne make their way to Lygon Street, the part of town affectionately called 'Little Italy', but Little Vietnam is far, far more interesting (and the food is better). Or, if you're really game you can go to Sydney Road in North Brunswick, which in places is like taking a trip to the Middle East.

On this level then, Melbourne really is a multicultural city. After moving again, this time to near Lygon Street in North Carlton, the neighbourhood has whitened out but there are still a great many elderly Italian people living here.

The point I'm trying to make is that despite all this diversity there aren't really any problems with 'ethnic conflict', and although neighbourhoods do take on a distinct ethnic feel, they are far from ghettos. That a big honky like me can wander round and not feel hassled or unwelcome is not unusual here. Sure, there is 'ethnic' violence, but Melbourne's gangland murders are confined to a very specific group of families, and some Vietnamese murders last year were by drunk teenagers who knew each other. Between ethnic groups you're always going to get your usual racist munter, but on the whole there is a high level of tolerance for difference.

It's surprising to find out then that as a government policy multiculturalism isn't about encouraging or expanding this type of diversity. The official policy 'multiculturalism' is instead only about tolerance of difference, and accepting that 'citizen' equals 'Australian'. Essentially, what Canberra says is that citizens are welcome to belong to whatever ethnic group or religion they want, as long as they obey laws and pay taxes. And cheer for Steve Waugh. Diversity flourishes because no one is worried about the details of their city's ethnic make-up. Except Hanson. And she got what she deserved.

I would argue that this type of tolerant multiculturalism is also common to New Zealand, the only real difference being that often it's Maori tolerating mainstream monoculturalism. As a whole though, New Zealand is and will remain a multicultural society. I remember to this day that 'Food Alley' on lower Albert Street did the best curry Laksa I've ever eaten. Pity getting there was a nightmare, and all the decent music in town was played by DJs.

Afghani-where?

by David Williams

The Independent newspaper kept us honest last week.

While the world (and US President George W Bush's tongue) came to terms with the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandal, the anti-war British daily has reminded us that there's still a job left to do in Afghanistan.

Under the headline: Afghanistan, the war the world forgot, we hear almost three years after the overthrow of the Taliban and George Bush's declaration of victory, the war-ravaged country is on the edge of anarchy.

Eric Ilsley, a Labour member of the Foreign Affairs Committee sent there to assess the situation, said: "Afghanistan is a basket case. It's a forgotten country."

You know, things seemed all so cut and dry a few years back.

There was a terrorist attack on the United States and the bad guy was in Afghanistan. The Taliban may have had a point when they asked the US to show them evidence their guest, Osama bin Laden, was responsible for the atrocities, but the US was sure of its man and we trusted it. The United Nations gathered behind the United States and we all went after bin Laden. Later we saw the video in which a laughing Osama told how he sent his minions to their deaths, not knowing what their mission would be until that fateful morning of September 11, 2001. We nodded sagely. They, the powers-that-be (and wanted Osama not to be) were right.

On the day of the Afghan invasion, October 7, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said the attack was being waged on three fronts: military, diplomatic and humanitarian. A coalition of support was being massed on the border to help deal with an estimated four million displaced Afghans.

"We have to act for humanitarian reasons to alleviate the appalling suffering of the Afghan people and deliver stability so that people from that region stay in that region," he said.

(Echoes of this statement were used to underline the need for a war on Iraq. But I digress)

Blair also said because the al-Qaeda network and the Taliban regime were funded in large part on the drugs trade, with 90 per cent of all the heroin sold on British streets originating from Afghanistan, stopping that trade was, again, directly in their interests.

So the bad guys lost (or ran into their caves) and we were re-assured the world was a better place thanks to President Bush‚s now familiar rhetoric. "Evil is real, but good will prevail against it," he told the United Nations General Assembly. We assumed bin Laden would be caught and his cronies rounded up and breathed a sigh of relief.

Again the international community rallied, this time behind Afghanistan. Ravaged by years of civil war, and then being taken back to the seventh century during six years of oppressive Taliban rule, billions of dollars in aid were pledged to get the broken country back on its feet.

On November 13, with the war almost won, Blair wrapped up a statement on Afghanistan with this:

"And finally I would simply say to the people of Afghanistan today, that this time we will not walk away from you. We have given commitments. We will honour those commitments, both on the humanitarian side and in terms of rebuilding Afghanistan. We are with you for the long term. You, the people, must agree your own government, and your own future, but we the coalition must give you the help and support that you need as you seek to rebuild your troubled country, and that support will be forthcoming."

Keep that statement in mind as we track how the waters have been muddied, how things became not so simple.

Talk of the axis of evil turned into military posturing, like a huge game of Risk. Weapons inspectors came and went, ultimatums were issued to the Hussein family and, then, shock and awe came to Iraq.

More confusion since. In Iraq, the army was disbanded and, months later, re-constituted. Then, when there was trouble in Fallujah with firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the Americans hand over security to an Iraqi force headed by a former Saddam Hussein general. De-Baathification was followed by attempts to re-Baathify certain cities recently. Oh, and Saddam's most sinister jail was turned into a torture chamber by the Anglo-American force (but it's okay because they're going to knock it down now - like they should have done in the first place).

Elsewhere, Libya's good, Syria's still bad and North Korea and Pakistan have been selling uranium and nuclear weapons to everyone under the sun (and haven‚t been punished - only because they're not an IMMINENT threat, I assume …). And, conveniently, Russia can now pass off operations in Chechnya as the war on terror. Neat!

Bush's popularity is on the decline, terror warnings are issued almost daily and suspected al-Qaeda operatives are rounded up and thrown in jail (sometimes without charge) all over the globe.

So things have moved quite dramatically since we breathed our collective sigh of relief after the ousting of the Taliban.

The latest is, according to a London think-tank the US and British occupation of Iraq has accelerated recruitment to the ranks of Osama bin Laden's terrorist network and made the world a less safe place. And Amnesty International asserts that human rights and international laws have come under the most sustained attack in 50 years from the "war on terror" (waged mainly by, yes, you guessed it, the United States and Britain).

And one of the biggest crimes in all of this confusion? The war that the world forgot in Afghanistan. Even the United States has forgotten. In February last year it even forgot to include funds for humanitarian aid and reconstruction in the country IT INVADED in its annual budget.

People in Afghanistan were hopeful for the future when I was there two years ago. They were happy to see the back of the Taliban, in the main, and they WANTED to believe things would get better. But after a while they admitted being wary of the American commitment to their destroyed country - especially with a looming war with Iraq. They have long memories, Afghans, but even those with short ones recall what happened after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Their American and British backers (this time in the war against communism) just forgot about them and left them to fight it out amongst themselves, with weapons paid for by those governments.

This time they said they wouldn't walk away. But walking away is exactly what the US and Britain have done, Afghans tell us in The Independent. Much of the humanitarian money has been diverted to military projects and emergency relief from long-term development. That's if the worsening security situation, which has seen dozens of aid workers killed or injured, allows humanitarian efforts to take place at all.

If Afghanistan is the model of how America brings democracy and peace to Asia and the Middle East then Iraq is in big trouble. US-installed President Hamid Karzai's rule extends only to the boundaries of the capital, with the warlords of old (some enlisted and armed in the fight against the Taliban) occupying the provinces. The UN reports that attacks by the Taliban have led to only 1.6 million out of the 10.5 million eligible electors being registered. The elections Karzai promised in June have been postponed and if pressure comes from the Bush administration to have them held before the US presidential election in November, then you have to wonder how legitimate they will be - and if the result will be endorsed by the international community at all.

The drugs trade that Blair wanted stamped out so quickly is thriving again too - poppy cultivation reached an all-time high last year.

What happened to the much-vaunted peace and stability? Why are these people STILL suffering? Were we just fed a story so the ongoing war on terror could fulfil George W Bush's date with destiny in Iraq?

The whole world made a commitment to Afghanistan. To repeat the British PM's words: "We have given commitments. We will honour those commitments." In spite of the war in Iraq, a situation the "Coalition of the Willing" subjected themselves to, the people of Afghanistan deserve the quality of life they were promised. It's time Blair and Co stuck to their word.

(If you feel so-moved then do something about it - write to your local MP, the Prime Minister or President or write a letter to your local paper).

There is an apparent connection between the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandal and prisoner deaths in Afghanistan in this New York Times story. I remember cutting out a story more than a year ago about the American government admitting two deaths being treated as homicide at Bagram Air Base, north of Kabul. Because of the slowness of the inquiry into the Afghan deaths, it seems a valuable warning about the treatment of prisoners in Iraq has come too late.

Untangling the Foreshore

by Jim Evans

I listen to the news on the foreshore issue each night and groan. For each night brings a fresh misunderstanding of the legal position. The issue would be hard to resolve even if its background was clearly understood, but without that there is just muddle, and we get increasingly into a tangle.

The political commentators have been poor - and we ought to expect better - but the politicians have been worse. Right up to the present I have not heard Helen Clarke say anything that suggests she has read the foreshore case (Attorney-General v Ngati Apa, [2003] 3 NZLR 643) or had good advice on it or tried to understand it. Just last week I heard her say that the whole problem resulted from a legal loophole in a statute. Not true. The night of the Hikoi she said that she flatly denied that Maori have any territorial rights in the foreshore. Well that is wrong too, and shows no understanding of the legal position.

Don Brash has been, if anything, worse, by exploiting Pakeha fears and sentiment. His comments suggest that he also has made little effort to understand the relevant law. On the night of the Hikoi he accused the Government of falsely suggesting that Maori might have some legal rights in the foreshore and the territorial sea. Well, the Court of Appeal has held that they may do so. Could he not take the trouble to find out why they said that?

These are, after all, two highly intelligent people, who have access to legal advisers. We expect leadership from them. What they have given us is not good enough.

Is the law then too complex to bear understanding by anyone other than lawyers? No. But it does require a little patience and the willingness to suspend emotion until the facts are in. I shall try here to set out the essential elements of the law and its historical background in a form accessible to non-lawyers. I will then make some comments on the position we are in.

Let us proceed in historical order. When English law was introduced into New Zealand in 1840 it came containing rules about how it would apply in such a territory - a territory judged to have no developed system of law. Three are central to understanding the present case:

1 If the sovereignty of the Queen was established (either by treaty, or, for that matter, by imposition) the existing inhabitants of the territory would automatically become British subjects, subject to English law and entitled to its rights. (I speak of "British subjects" here for that was the terminology then used to describe subjects of the United Kingdom of England, Scotland and Ireland; but I speak of "English law" because it was that particular system - as distinct from Scottish or Irish law - that was introduced by colonization.)

2 The lands and other properties possessed by the native inhabitants would be protected.

3 The native inhabitants could not sell land to anyone other than the Crown.

This ought to sound familiar. For these are, in effect, the rules set out in the English version of the Treaty of Waitangi. On the British side, the treaty was not intended to create new law that would apply in the new territory, but rather to state the rights that would automatically apply under English law if Maori accepted the Queen's sovereignty and the country then became a colony. The Ngati Apa decision was not based on the Treaty, but on this existing law. It was law established by cases rather than statutes, and thus part of what is called the "common law" within the system that the colonists introduced. The terms of the English version of the Treaty make quite clear how this particular part of the common law was understood by the British Colonial Office in 1838 and 1839 when it formed a plan for the colonization of New Zealand.

The Maori version of the Treaty (the version most commonly signed) is in somewhat different terms, but, although this point is important in some contexts, it makes no difference to the present issue. For, as I have said, the decision in the Ngati Apa case was not based on the Treaty, but on the common law that its English version expressed.

A further rule needs to be mentioned. English law came into force in New Zealand only "insofar as applicable to the circumstances of the colony". That was the original common law rule on the reception of English law in a colony such as New Zealand, but in 1858 it was put into a statute and in this form it remains the current law.

Early on, colonial courts conscientiously observed the common law that was expressed in the Treaty. In 1847, Governor Grey set up a test case to get a firm ruling on the law relating to native title. A bench of two judges held that such title was a legal title, recognizable in the courts, but that only the Crown could extinguish it - in other words it couldn't be transferred to a non-Maori. It is absolutely plain that this decision was not based on the Treaty, but on established case-law.

The position changed dramatically in 1877. In a case called Wi Parata v the Bishop of Wellington a bench of two judges held that the rights of natives to their land were not something that could be recognised in the courts. A single sentence from the judgment indicates both the tone and the effect of the judgment: ".. in the case of primitive barbarians, the supreme executive Government must acquit itself, as best it may, of its obligation to respect native proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the sole arbiter of its own justice".

Put more precisely, the judges reduced the native title from a legal right to a mere moral right that imposed an obligation on the conscience of the Crown (meaning here the executive). The significance of this shows up starkly in a case a little later in which a judge held that Maori owners could not rely on their native title in the courts even to obtain an order to evict a trespasser from their land.

The two judges in the Wi Parata case did not put forward any sound legal argument for their view. They cite earlier cases that quite clearly deal with legal rights and misinterpret them as dealing with a moral right only. So far as there is a discernable ground for the decision it is the blunt assertion that there was no system of customary rights existing among Maori that could form the basis for the recognition of legal rights in the courts. But such customary rights had been recognized by the Crown in negotiations since 1840 and by the legislature since at least 1862. So for the judges to assert that no such customary system of rights existed was extraordinary They took no evidence on the point, merely asserting their own opinion.

Despite these defects, the decision in the Wi Parata case had a huge influence on subsequent legal thinking within New Zealand. It blocked recognition that a doctrine of native title existed as part of the common law.

From 1862, various New Zealand statutes established a court, eventually called the Maori Land Court, to settle Maori rights in land as the prelude to the grant of an English title. (Often, in practice, this was a preparation for a sale to a non-Maori.) At a later time, lawyers influenced by the Wi Parata view of the law sought to understand the reference to native rights contained in these statutes. Recognizing that the Treaty (like any other treaty) did not create any legal rights in New Zealand unless it was implemented by statute - a point that is right as far as it goes - they came to the conclusion that these rights were created as legal rights by the statutes to give effect to the moral obligation the Crown had assumed under the Treaty. A corollary was that, strictly, Maori had no legal rights in land other than those created by a statute.

When the New Zealand Court of Appeal was asked to rule on the status of the foreshore in 1963, in a case called In re the Ninety-mile Beach, it took this view of the law for granted. Maori rights in the foreshore could exist, it held, only if they had been created by statute. It then went on to hold that a right of a sort in land had been conferred on Maori by those statutes that established the Maori Land Court. The scope of the right was that the Crown ensure that an English title not be issued until Maori rights in the land had been properly extinguished.

However, the Court went on to note that when English titles had been granted to land adjacent to the sea they had almost always extended only to high-water mark. It held that such grants extinguished any title beyond that. The reason was that an order of the Maori Land Court and the Governor's subsequent grant of a title based on that order were intended to settle all Maori claims in the area. So the duty of the Crown to protect Maori rights that the statute had created was then fully satisfied. The judges did not contemplate that a legal right in the foreshore might exist at common law independently of the statutes.

Were it not for one fact, the Wi Parata view of the common law might have justified an argument that, right or wrong, it established a line of precedents within New Zealand that should be observed by later courts. That critical fact is that the Wi Parata view was never accepted by the then highest court in the New Zealand hierarchy - the Privy Council. In several decisions on New Zealand appeals the Privy Council criticized this view when it had influenced lower courts in New Zealand. Regrettably, because the legal issues in these cases were complex, the nub of the Privy Council's criticism was never understood in New Zealand. The Privy Council also took a different view of native title in decisions on appeals from other countries.

During the 1980's, legal scholars studied the legal history afresh and identified the shift of thought that occurred in Wi Parata. They criticized that case as inconsistent with basic principles of justice, inconsistent with earlier case-law and inconsistent with later decisions of the Privy Council. From 1986, the Wi Parata view began to be rejected by New Zealand courts. The Court of Appeal firmly rejected it in 1994. However, its application to the foreshore did not arise until the Ngati Apa case last year.

Nevertheless, from the 1980's it was plain to those who understood the history that the Ninety-mile Beach decision was suspect. Legal scholars have been issuing warnings to this effect for some considerable time. So there is no reason why the Government should have been caught unawares by the decision in Ngati Apa. In Ngati Apa the Court of Appeal rejected the Wi Parataview of the common law and held that the Ninety-mile Beach decision was wrong.

In the Ngati Apa case, the Crown not only disputed the view of the common law that I have set out above, it also relied on various statutes that appeared to confer title in the foreshore or the adjacent sea on the Crown. In some cases these arguments failed because of the detailed text of the statutes, but one uniform theme was of over-riding importance. None of these statutes did anything more than confer on the Crown the sort of fundamental title - referred to in the case as "radical title" - that is the basis of all rights to land in a system based on English law. In an English system even normal freehold title - the sort of title that ordinary home-owners have - exists only as a restriction on this fundamental title of the Crown. Of course, if a freehold title has been granted the fundamental title of the Crown leaves it few rights; but it can, nevertheless, exercise some residual rights in time of war.

The law is that when the Crown acquires its fundamental title in a new territory in which native titles apply the Crown holds its fundamental title subject to the limitation of the native titles. A good analogy is an ordinary citizen acquiring freehold title in a property knowing it is already subject to a registered long-term lease: from the moment it is acquired the property is then held subject to the lease. None of the statutes relied on by the Crown showed any intention to take away the native title as a limitation of this sort on the fundamental title of the Crown.

It may be objected that the reason they did not is that those who framed these statutes did not believe that any native title existed in the foreshore or adjacent sea. That is no doubt true, as comments by long-standing former members of Parliament, such as Michael Bassett, have illustrated. But it is trite legal learning that if those who draft statutes make a mistake about the existing state of the law that does not make the law into what it was wrongly thought to be. Parliament can make any law it chooses, but it must do so by passing an Act: it cannot do so merely by displaying a misunderstanding of the existing law.

In Ngati Apa the Court of Appeal held that a native title might exist in the foreshore or the seabed if no Crown grant or statutory grant has ever been made of a title covering those areas. In fact, some grants have been made, many of them to local authorities. In other cases, standard Land Transfer Act titles that extend to fixed survey points that were once on dry land now extend into the sea, because the coast has eroded. The effect of the decision is that in other situations a claim to native title is currently possible.

What, then, must be proved to establish such a title? This is not entirely clear, but a rough statement is: enjoyment in 1840 of effective control held as of right under customary understandings. Nothing in the doctrine of native title requires that the holders of such a title must have maintained a continuous presence since that time, although Maori notions of territorial right seem themselves to have contained such an element. In any event, there is no good reason why Maori who subsequently failed to maintain a presence because the law failed to support their rights should lose them as a consequence.

If native titles could be proved, what would they include? Obviously, this would depend on what was effectively controlled in 1840. It would also depend on what Maori could fairly be taken to have sold at the time that land adjacent to the coast was sold to non-Maori. Apart from this, there would be some legal limitations. One that would certainly apply is that Maori could not sell their rights to anyone other than the Crown. For in 1840, that was an established part of the rules regarding native title.

Two other limitations are likely, although not certain. These are that any rights established would be subject to public rights of access for navigation and fishing. The ground for such a limitation is that the fundamental title of the Crown at common law was subject to these rights in the public long before 1840. In England the law was, and still is, that the Crown cannot, without statutory authority, grant to private persons any rights in the foreshore or seabed that are free from these rights in the public. On the principle that the Crown could not give what it did not have, it could not have allowed these rights to Maori in 1840 as a limitation on its fundamental title. The High Court of Australia has recently ruled to this effect in a case involving an aboriginal claim to areas off the coast of the Northern territory. In its report on the foreshore issue in this country the Waitangi Tribunal also recognized the force of this argument.

An argument to the contrary is possible. It would be that the rules establishing these limitations were not applicable to the circumstances of the colony in 1840, these circumstances including the presence of a people that made extensive territorial claims to the foreshore and areas of the adjacent sea. After all, the Crown had just made a solemn promise to protect the lands and fisheries of the Maori people - and no limitation was expressed that these lands and fisheries must be inland. With regard to navigation I think it is unlikely this argument would succeed. Public rights of navigation were an obvious need of the new colony. In any event, public use of the sea was an established rule of international law with which Maori would eventually have needed to come to terms, regardless of colonization.

The right to control fishing is more tricky. Commercial fishing has now been settled by the fishing settlement of 1992, but recreational fishing by non-Maori is still a potential issue. If the system of law introduced by the colonists in 1840 did not adequately protect rights in the territorial sea, because it allowed a public right of fishing that would be a breach of the Treaty. However, it is not clear that the test "insofar as applicable to the circumstances of the colony" could be used to give protection against such a breach. The presence of a people that made substantial claims to areas of the sea is the strongest point on this issue.

Assuming that all of these limitations hold, what is left as the content of native title? In principle, everything else that might be part of a territorial right - but subject, of course, to proof of actual control as of right. Among the remaining rights those likely to be most contentious are recreational uses of the foreshore, the control of other uses of the sea than for navigation or fishing (eg marine farming), and the use of resources on or under the seabed. Among the first, some beaches will have been acquired in circumstances that showed an intention to surrender rights in the foreshore: those sold to the New Zealand Company in Wellington are a likely case. Among the last, rights to petroleum have already gone, for they were nationalized for the country as a whole - both land and sea - in the 1930's.

If we want to have a basis for thinking about how the issue ought to be resolved, in addition to understanding this state of the law we need to take account of the quite extraordinary history that we are confronting. Maori, it turns out, had legal rights from 1840 that were denied for a long period in our history. But, to turn the other side of this coin, for a long period most people have not known that. Important parts of the culture of our present society have developed on the premise that the foreshore and the seabed are publicly owned and available for everyone to use. Much development that has contributed to making the foreshore and the adjacent sea widely usable, and used, has been created in this belief. Not only the ancient culture of our indigenous people, but also the current culture of our present people, is on the line in this issue.

Had it not been for the affront to Maori in the way matters have developed politically since the decision in Ngati Apa, I do not think the significance of this would be denied. Indeed, I sense that a strengthening of the country's resolve to preserve effective public access to the coast and the sea is a necessary part of the solution that has to be found.

Against this background, how adequate is the Government's Bill? Over the coming weeks those making submissions to Parliament will have to read it. That will be healthy, because whether or not its solution is ideal, it is at least a genuine attempt to find an acceptable compromise.

Broadly, the Bill does six things.

1 It places ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Crown, except for bits that are already the subject of a freehold title in someone else. The Crown cannot transfer this ownership to anyone else without statutory authority.

2 It removes all relevant common law rights in the public and creates new statutory rights in their place. The first among these is a new right of access to the foreshore and seabed. The second is a new statutory right of navigation. Common law rights to fishing are simply removed altogether, leaving fishing rights to be governed solely by the Fisheries Act 1996, regulations made under it, and the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992.

3 It removes common law rights of native title.

4 It allows the Maori Land Court to make orders protecting usages of Maori that have been traditionally enjoyed down to the present. These are then to be entered in a public register. None of these orders can cut across the public right of access created by the legislation without an order agreed by two Ministers, one of whom must be the Minister of Conservation. Similar protection is available for sacred sites. Additionally, instead of going to the Maori Land Court, Maori may negotiate with the Minister of Maori Affairs and the Minister in charge of Treaty Negotiations to create an agreement that recognises traditional usages. If an agreement is reached, these usages will be placed on the register.

5 It allows the High Court to make an order that, but for the Act, a group would have held territorial customary rights to a particular area of the foreshore or seabed, unless the territorial right can be adequately protected by a registered usage right. When the High Court makes such an order it must refer it to the Attorney-General and the Minister of Maori Affairs who then must enter into discussions with the group. The purpose of such discussions is "to consider the nature and extent of any redress that the Crown may give".

6 It amends the Resource Management Act to protect registered usage rights.

The bit of this that seems most obviously questionable is that there is no automatic right to compensation for the loss of rights that might have formed part of a native title. Normally, a public taking of property rights would carry that. The Ministers are directed to negotiate, and the purpose of the negotiation is clearly stated, but there is no statement that full current value is to be paid.

The reason that full compensation should normally be paid for any public taking of property rights is that otherwise the burden of providing a public good falls disproportionately on the owners of the right rather than being shared by the community as a whole. Perhaps it can be argued that this principle does not fully apply to the foreshore and the adjacent seabed as often much of the current value will have been created by the public as a whole operating under a misunderstanding of the legal position. However, that argument won't always apply, so the fairness of this system will very much depend on how Ministers exercise their power.

Pakeha need also to understand that it is not just money value that is at stake for Maori. Part of what is lost if there is a public taking is the capacity to exercise that measure of control that native title would have carried - not control for its own sake, but because of the caring that can go with it. I do not see how this can be fully protected, for in the end there are some rights that ought to be firmly secured to the public. But at least the significance of this loss needs to be understood.

One gap in the Bill, as it seems to me, is the lack of an ability for Maori to secure in kind any of the property rights that might have been part of a native title, rather than to have their loss compensated by money. The right to create marine farms is an obvious case in point. At present the Bill does not allow for the grant of such rights, but relatively minor change could create it as an option for the Ministers who must negotiate about redress.

The Bill goes for clarity and precision. In the longer term we may come to think that was the right course. In the shorter term the Bill needs to be better explained: particularly to Maori, who have been treated badly in the public discussions so far. But it also needs to be explained to Pakeha, for if it is not, they are likely not to understand why at least this much must be conceded, and, as a consequence, to bear a mistaken sense of grievance.

This paper is an attempt to explain the legal background to the Foreshore decision and the current Bill before Parliament that has resulted from it in a form accessible to non-lawyers. It reflects the author's personal opinions only, not those of Auckland University or the Auckland Law School.

Treaty Obligations and the New Zealand Citizen

by Che Tibby

When I was at the University of Auckland I wrote a Masters dissertation on the Treaty negotiations between the Crown and Tainui and went into it with a healthy degree of scepticism. Despite being suspicious that it was yet another effort by 'the man' to rip off some disaffected locals I was surprised to find that Doug Graham and his delegated team were actually trying to make progress against the kinds of injustices being increasingly uncovered by the Waitangi Tribunal.

Sure, whenever you get a bunch of well-meaning bureaucrats around a table together you're always going to get some pompous do-gooders trying to run the show, but at least there was actually some traction made and systems were laid in place to solve the social time bomb that was Maori grievance.

Having put that Masters to good use and gone to work as a dispatcher for Auckland Co-op taxis, I eventually escaped and made it to Melbourne uni. Now I'm in the final throes of building on that dissertation with a comparative study of Australian Aboriginal-'Ocker' interaction. It's harrowing stuff.

I've been following the debates ever since Brash 'that' speech and it's been interesting to see that all too often people supposedly 'in the know' don't seem to have any idea what in hell they're talking about. Maybe it's a proximity thing, from over here the conservative arguments can seem pretty petty.

So, I was reading Russell Brown's recent post where he asked for contributions about Treaty Obligations (Knowing what we believe, May 11, 2004 12:09) and thought I'd send him a wee opinion piece. Much to my surprise he accepted! It's a little like being asked to speak on Holmes or something. But without the golliwog. And, like a Holmes show there's always a few key points that the mass-media debaters seem to miss or overlook.

The most important thing is that the Treaty has always been a reference point for whatever opinion the contemporary commentator, whoever they are, wants to present. Conservatives will usually talk of the Treaty in reference to Hobson and state, "we're all New Zealanders". Liberals, or what conservatives these days like to call "the left", will usually talk of the Treaty as a means to justify minority rights for Maori. Consequently, the Treaty tends to end up meaning whatever the hell you want it to, which is a very tricky thing.

I've noticed during that there are good reasons for making a utility out of the Treaty though, and the reasons are very, very telling about the kind of future New Zealand these people see themselves living in. Essentially, it all boils down to a much maligned and misunderstood ideology called nationalism.

Nationalism is the idea that you can influence or direct the cultural and ethnic composition of a states citizenry, and is set in train by a process called nation-building. What nationalism is not all about is ethnic cleansing or fascism, they're both called ethnic chauvinism, which is another kettle of fish altogether.

What you need to remember there is that nation-building is all about influencing the cultural 'feel' of a states citizens, because that leads us to my next point.

When Phillip Temple refers to the Treaty and us all being New Zealand citizens from the outset he's missing the very important fact that in 1840 there were no British citizens. There were subjects. Democracy only became a reality as franchise was opened to working class men, and subsequently women, in the late nineteen and early twentieth century. He's also missing the important fact that being a citizen doesn't mean you're actually part of a national society Saying "I'm a kee-wee" in an American accent is guaranteed to get a few smirks.

In plain English what the Treaty offered Maori was inclusion as subjects of the Crown, with a guarantee of equality to other subjects (Article Three). When British subjects resident in New Zealand eventually became 'real' citizens Maori were brought along by default. There's a good book on the topic in relation to Australia by Alastair Davidson called "From Subject to Citizen", and is part of a growing literature on the matter. The inference you can draw from this is that Maori have the social obligations of all other New Zealanders.

I agree then with Phillip that Maori have obligations to the government and the country as New Zealand citizens. But no one with any credibility would argue they don't. The fact that something like the hikoi takes Maori demands to Parliament shows that they're politically engaged with the state.

What further reinforces my point is that this customary rights debate is at its core a resource issue, not a political one. But, as a resource issue it is being determined via political processes (good one Helen...), and this is were the complication starts.

I'm going to sidestep this issue of resources being distributed by political means, and return to that nation-building blurb above in favour of a point Russell might like.
How many people immigrate to New Zealand to become Maori? This sounds facetious but it's a very serious point. The answer is no one. People immigrate to New Zealand to become New Zealanders. Being Maori and being a New Zealander are two very different things, and it is possible to be both.

The best way to explain this is to say that all Maori are New Zealanders, but not all New Zealanders are Maori. Much of the conservative talk about us all being New Zealanders tends to overlook this. Being a 'New Zealander' includes Maori but this is not the same as 'New Zealander' meaning actually being Maori. And this is why knee-jerk conservative arguments about us all being New Zealanders will never really hold water.

The identity 'Maori will always be something that has to be held onto on the face of pressures for conformity to majority ideas about what being a New Zealander is all about. Maori commentators and representatives know this, and you can't but get the feeling that conservatives either don't, or choose not to.

Part of the problem is that conservatives tend to utilise an outdated idea of what nation-building is, an idea that is more at home in the realities of New Zealand 1864 than 2004. What such an idea usually says is that you can only have one identity associated with a state or government. Hence nation-state. But modern realities mean that this type of idea is obsolete and is currently open to question in countries worldwide.

At the most practical level what nation-building for New Zealand means is that governments constantly work to make the national society more cohesive, it has to be. It provides means like education that turn people into New Zealanders, be they immigrants or the children of citizens (babies are not automatically ethnically New Zealanders, they become one as they grow up). From these little systems you get generation after generation of New Zealanders.

And this begs the question, where does Maori identity come from? And, if you have to ask this then you might find that you're thinking like a British subject, and not a New Zealand citizen.

This is why there is distinct ways of governance in New Zealand. We only need one government, but there has to be different ways to govern as you get closer and closer to the people you're representing. In return for loyalty to the one New Zealand government (Article One of the Treaty), Maori have been increasingly granted autonomy over things Maori since the 1980s. And believe me this is no small matter, there are a great many minority groups world-wide who do not have the same privilege, Australian Aboriginal people included.

Maori identity has to be represented somewhere to stop it being overwhelmed. The mutual obligations of the numerous Maori governance groups in New Zealand are therefore both to the people or communities they represent, and to the wider society to represent them fairly and accurately.

This is because the only way to keep a vibrant Maori society, which has always been distinct from mainstream society, is to see it engaged with the majority as both New Zealand citizens and as Maori. A situation in which there is no contradiction of loyalty. And, if you don't think that Maori society has been distinct, you're going to want to read some Michael King or James Belich. Or move out of Gore.

As a final note, this customary title thing is an economic issue, but has politicised by representatives trying to secure resources for the groups they themselves are obliged to represent. A behaviour demonstrated by both Maori and mainstream alike.

Without the ability to argue for and secure these types of resources as Maori and for Maori, the minority will be faced with absorption into the mainstream, a long-standing and unnecessary dream of conservatives.